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V

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of the Final Order dated October 15, 2008 by the
Honorable Judge Robert Faust in the above-captioned case in trial court. [R275.]
This Court has jurisdiction by assignment from the Utah Supreme Court § 78A-4103(2)0).

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE: The trial court disregarded the parties' contract containing a feeshifting provision, and refused to award attorney fees and costs to either party.
Did the trial court incorrectly disregard the contract and should attorney fees
and costs have been awarded to 14 Solutions?
WHERE PRESERVED: Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees [R237]; and
Notice of Appeal [R282.].
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Attorney fee decisions that involve questions
of law or statutory interpretation are reviewed for correctness.1

{

A.K & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 94 P.3d 270, 272 (Utah 2004);
see also Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P.3d 1041, 1044 (Utah 2007).
VI

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code § 78B-5-826:
Attorney fees - Reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees.
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil
action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract,
or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney fees.
Rule 73(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
When attorney fees are authorized by contract or by law, a request for attorney fees
shall be supported by affidavit or testimony . ..

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
The parties executed a work-service agreement containing a fee-shifting
provision (the "Contract"), pursuant to which 14 agreed to design an Internet
website for Robertson. Robertson subsequently sued 14 for improperly designing
the website, and 14 counterclaimed for monies owed for properly designing the
website.

Final judgment against Plaintiff/Appellee Robertson and in favor of

vii

Defendant/Appellant 14 was entered on 14's unjust enrichment counterclaim after a
bench trial in 2008; however, the trial court refused to award attorney fees pursuant
to the fee-shifting provision in the contract. The issue on appeal involves the
propriety of the trial court's refusal to award attorney fees and costs.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Third Judicial District Court conducted a bench trial on August 28,
2008.
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION
The trial court found for Defendant/Appellant and against Plaintiff/Appellee
in the amount of $1,800, but ordered both sides to bear the cost of their own
attorneys' fees. [R275.]

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
(l)Plaintiff/Appellee Robertson Marine ("Robertson") initiated this contract
action against Defendant/Appellant 14 Solutions ("14") on March 9, 2006
seeking damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising out of
14's alleged failure to complete the design of a website on the Internet for
Robertson. [R001.]
(2) 14 filed compulsory counterclaims in response to Robertson's claims,
viii

including counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment,
alleging it had finished designing Robertson's website and was owed unpaid
monies under contract. [ROM.]
(3) A contract which was executed April 19, 2005 between Robertson and 14
(the "Contract") formed the basis of both the claims and counterclaims, and
contained a fee shifting provision requiring the non-prevailing party to pay
the prevailing party's attorneys' fees. [R001 at Exhibit A.] Robertson
expressly agreed in the Contract in writing, "I agree to pay all collection
costs, including court costs and reasonable attorney's fees if collection is
required," [Id. (emphasis added).]
(4) Plaintiff and Defendant both attached the Contract to their trial pleadings
[Id], motions and memoranda [R099 at Exhibit A], included it in exhibit
lists [R209], and stipulated to its admissibility before trial. The Contract
was repeatedly referred to during both parties opening statements [R294
Trial Tr. 6:12 - 10:11], and throughout the bench trial over two hundred
times. Robertson asked the trial court for attorney fees at the close of trial in
accordance with the Contract, reminding the trial court the Contract required
them, moving the trial court orally as follows at R294 162:8-20:

ix

MR. MCINTYRE: Your Honor . . . Robertson's has spent a whole lot
of money trying to get their money back. I think [Roberson] also
ought to be entitled to attorney's fees.
THE COURT: I didn't look at the contract, does it contain an
attorney's fee clause?
MR. MCINTYRE: It does, your Honor.
(5) After a bench trial held on August 28, 2008, the Honorable Judge Robert
Faust ruled against Plaintiff/Appellee Robertson on all of Robertson's
claims, and found for Defendant/Appellant 14 on 14's unjust enrichment
claim in the amount of $1,800. [R233.]
(6) Affidavits of attorney fees were submitted before the ruling by both parties
in accordance with Rule 73(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R225;
R229.]
(7) Despite finding for 14, in its minute entry of September 3, 2008, the trial
court refused to award attorney fees and costs to either party, ruling that
"[e]ach side is ordered to pay their own attorney fees and costs." [R225.]
(8) 14 subsequently moved the trial court to award attorneys' fees, but had its
motion denied. [R237; R269.]
(9) The Final Order of October 15, 2008 likewise required that "[e]ach side is
X

ordered to pay their own attorney fees and costs." [R275.]

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The contract executed by the parties which underlies this dispute requires the
loser to pay the prevailing parties' attorney fees. The trial court erred in not
awarding attorney fees. Defendant/Appellant 14 was the prevailing party, and is
entitled to attorney fees under the law.

XI

ARGUMENT
Attorney fees and costs should be awarded to Defendant/Appellant 14
Solutions ("14") in this case, including fees expended on trial as well as those
expended on appeal. Fees and costs should be awarded because: (1) the contract
underlying the dispute contained a fee-shifting provision; (2) 14 defeated all of
Plaintiff/Appellee Robertson Marine's ("Robertson") claims in trial; and (3) 14
prevailed and was awarded judgment on its own counterclaims.
I.

THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONTAINS A FEESHIFTING PROVISION AND WAS PART OF THE RECORD
The contract between the parties for services was executed on April 19, 2005

between Robertson and 14 and is indexed in the record as ROOl at Exhibit A
(hereinafter the "Contract"), and is attached hereto as Addendum A. Pursuant to
the terms of the Contract, Robertson paid $3,275, or fifty-percent (50%) of the
contract price, to 14 on April 19, 2005, with the remaining balance of $3,275 due
upon completion of the Robertson's website in accordance with the Contract. [Id.]
After the webdesign was completed, Robertson sued 14 for the return of it original
$3,275 payment and 14 counterclaimed for the remaining amount owed under the
Contract of $3,275. [R001;R014.]
The Contract contained a fee-shifting provision, marcated by hand before

l

being executed, reading, "I agree to pay all collection costs and reasonable
attorney's fees if collection is required" and signed by Robertson.

[R001 at

Exhibit A.]
Both parties made the Contract part of the record as set forth above.
II.

14 PREVAILED ON ITS COUNTERCLAIMS AND ROBERTSON
FAILED TO PREVAIL ON ITS CLAIMS
In a bench trial on August 28, 2008, Robertson lost of all its claims and

recovered nothing. 14 was awarded $1,800 against Robertson on its counterclaim
for unjust enrichment by the Court ruling, "[jjudgment is awarded in favor of
Defendant on its unjust enrichment cause of action for $1,800." [R233.] The final
order entered by the Honorable Judge Faust was silent as to disposition of 14's
breach of contract claim, but held that the elements of breach of contract were met
as discussed below. Appellant submits that the trial court ruled impliedly that 14
prevailed on both of its counterclaims, not just for unjust enrichment, but also
breach of contract.
A.

The Trial Court Held that 14 Carried its Burden of Proof on Each of
the Elements of Breach of Contract.

The elements of the breach of contract claim in Utah are: (1) a contract, (2)
performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of contract by the other
party, and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, f 14, 20 P.3d
2

388.
In its ruling of September 3, 2008, the Court found each of the elements
necessary to sustain Defendant/Appellant's breach of contract claim in its findings
of fact, including that "the parties had an agreement concerning the preparation of
a website by Defendant for Plaintiff5 [R275 at ^f 2 ]; as well as that "Defendant
performed these services by completing the majority of the work on Plaintiffs
website" [Id. at | 2]; and that Defendant "is entitled to be paid for the same
[$1,800]" [Id. at f 13]. The Court recognized the written Contract in determining
damages, when it referred to "the value of $6,550.00 in the agreement between the
Parties." [Id. at ^15.]

III.

ATTORNEY FEES MUST BE AWARDED IN STRICT
ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT

The trial court erred, as a matter of law, by failing to award attorney fees in
strict accordance with contractual language of the parties' written contract. Rule
73(a) of the URCP provides that "[w]hen attorney fees are authorized by contract
or by law, a request for attorney fees shall be supported by affidavit." Affidavits of
attorney fees were submitted to the trial court in anticipation of an attorney fee
award.
The Honorable Judge Faust may have felt it was not equitable to award
3

attorney fees that would exceed the amount of the judgment itself, but attorney fees
in Utah are awarded as a matter of right that arises from a contract or statute with
regard to equitable principles.2 Where fees are provided for by contract, they are
allowed only in strict accordance with the terms of the contract and are not subject
to an equitable standard of evaluation by the court because they are awarded as a
matter of legal right.
Accordingly, since the right is contractual, the court does not have the same
equitable discretion to deny attorney fees as it does when applying a statute that
allows for discretion. Therefore, the provisions in contracts that allow for attorney
fees ".. .should ordinarily be honored by the courts."3
Plaintiff/Appellee agreed in the Contract, which formed the basis of this
action, to pay attorney fees, acknowledging expressly, "I agree to pay all collection
costs, including court costs and reasonable attorney's fees if collection is required,"
and attorney fees should be awarded.
IV.

UNDER ALL POSSIBLE LEGAL ANALYSES, 14 IS THE
PREVAILING PARTY.

Utah Code § 78B-5-826 provides that, "[a] court may award costs and
attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any
2

Foote v. Clarkf 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998).
"Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 809 (Utah Ct.App. 1992).
4

promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986,
when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow
at least one party to recover attorney fees."
Defendant/Appellant 14 is the prevailing party in this action. Under each of
the three analyses that might be applied to record, Defendant/Appellant is the
prevailing party.

In the first legal analysis, Defendant/Appellant 14 is the

prevailing party because it defeated all of Plaintiff/Appellee's claims.

In the

second legal analysis, Defendant/Appellant 14 is the prevailing party because it
must be recognized that it prevailed on its breach of contract claim against
Plaintiff/Appellee.

In the third legal analysis, Defendant/Appellant 14 is the

prevailing party because it prevailed on a single equitable and compulsory
counterclaim (unjust enrichment).
A.

Defendant/Appellant 14 is the Prevailing Party Because it Defeated
All of Plaintiff/Appellee's Claims.

Even if this Court determines that both parties lost their breach of contract
claims, and that Defendant/Appellant's victory on it compulsory unjust enrichment
claim is irrelevant to determining who prevailed in this contract action,
Defendant/Appellant is still the prevailing party for the purposes of awarding
attorney fees. Authority across the country has recognized that a defendant is the

5

prevailing party when he defeats a plaintiffs claims, even if the defendant fails to
win its own claims.
"In cases involving the dismissal of both a complaint and a counterclaim, it
has frequently been held that the defendant is the ffprevailing party," and is entitled
to recover costs under the applicable statutory provision." 66 A.L.R.3d 1087. "A
party who is only partially successful also can be deemed a prevailing party.
Consequently, a claimant who has obtained some relief usually will be regarded as
the prevailing party even though he has not sustained all his claims." 10 FPP §
2667 attached hereto as Addendum B.
The Court must determine which party prevailed in this action, and award
attorney fees accordingly.
B.

The Parties to this Action Cannot Have Simultaneously Prevailed.

Utah law recognizes that there can only be one prevailing party in litigation
arising out of a single transaction. For this reason the Court cannot conclude that
both 14 and Robertson prevailed, or that neither prevailed. The Court must pick a
winner. Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1998), provides
that "There can be only one prevailing party in any litigation." (emphasis
added). Additionally, Chang v. Soldier Summit Dev., 2003 UT App 415,f 27, 82
P.3d 203 held that "because we agree with both the trial couifs determination that
6

[defendants were the prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorney fees
and its decision to award attorney fees to [defendants, an award of attorney fees to
[p]laintiffs would have been inappropriate." See also Mountain States Broad. Co.
v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 648 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (holding that the trial court erred
in awarding both sides their attorney fees, even though the contract at issue
awarded attorney fees to "the prevailing party" and both sides had "prevailed to
some extent," on the basis that "there can be only one prevailing party"), clarified
by 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct.App.1989). The term "prevailing party" is defined as
"'[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered.'" A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing
& Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73,t 11, 47 P.3d 92 (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 1145 (7th ed.1999)), affd, 2004 UT 47, 94 P.3d 270. Therefore, "[a]
party ... is not a prevailing party until after a determination on the merits is made
by either a jury or a trial court judge." J. V. Hatch Constr., Inc. v. Kampros, 971
P.2d 8, 13 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (emphasis omitted).
The Utah Court of Appeals held in Mountain States Broadcasting at 556 that
"[i]t appears that where both plaintiff and defendant recover in the same action but
the counterclaim does not arise from the same transaction as the plaintiffs claim,
both parties may be considered to have prevailed and, therefore, to be entitled to a
portion of their fees. See, e.g., Elder v. Triax Co., 740 P.2d 1320, 1321-22 (Utah
7

1987); Moran v. Lewis, 131 Conn. 680, 41 A.2d 905, 905 (1945). However, this
rule would not apply here because Mountain States' claim and NBAfs
counterclaim arose from the same transaction." (emphasis added). By the
logic of the Utah Court of Appeals in this decision, both parties to the action at bar
cannot be considered to have prevailed, because, like in Mountain States, one party
prevailed

on

a

counterclaim

arising

from

the

same

transaction

as

Plaintiff/Appellee's claims. Therefore, only one party can be the prevailing party
and that party is 14.
14 is entitled to attorney fees by the plain language of the contract. 'The
plain language of the contract provides that the prevailing party has a right to an
award of attorney fees incurred in the pursuit or defense of an action arising from a
claimed violation of the contract. Since Equitable incurred fees both in pursuing its
claim for breach of contract and in defending against David E. Ross II's claim for
rescission, it is clearly entitled to an award of attorney fees in regard to both
actions." Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah
CtApp. 1993).
As with Equitable, Defendant/Appellant incurred fees defending against
Plaintiff/Appellee's action. Defendant/Appellant's unjust enrichment claim in the
case at bar was a defensive action "arising from the claimed violation of the
8

contract" and 14 is entitled to attorney fees.
C.

Defendant/Appellant 14 is the Prevailing Party Because it Should be
Interpreted to Have Won its Breach of Contract Counterclaim.

As established above, although the trial court awarded damages to
Defendant/Appellant on its unjust enrichment claim, the trial court also ruled in its
final judgment that 14 also met each of the elements of its breach of contract claim.
14 should therefore be interpreted to be the prevailing party on its claim under the
Contract requiring attorney fees.
D.

Defendant/Appellant 14 is the Prevailing Party Because it Prevailed on
its Counterclaim For Unjust Enrichment.

Persuasive federal authority also bears on this analysis. In an action between
two insurance brokerages in which the court granted summary judgment to the
defendant on plaintiffs claims and also granted summary judgment to the plaintiff
on defendant's counterclaims, the court held that the lower court did not err when
it awarded attorney fees to the defendant under a contractual provision providing
for the recovery of attorney fees by the "substantially prevailing party," rejecting
plaintiffs contention that the defendant did not "substantially prevail"
because it lost on its counterclaims. In so ruling, the court noted that the lower
court characterized defendants counter-claims as "defensive" in that it brought
those claims only because they were compulsory, and concluded that plaintiffs
9

claims against the defendant predominated in the litigation, and in securing their
dismissal the defendant won more than it lost. Tax Track Systems Corp. v. New
Investor World, Inc., 478 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2007).
Even if Defendant/Appellant had not prevailed on any of its compulsory
counterclaims as with Tax Track Systems (though it did), Defendant/Appellant 14 is
still entitled to attorneys' fees because it defeated Robertson's claims with
counterclaims that were "defensive" in nature (i.e. its unjust enrichment claim).
V.

PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS COMPEL AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY FEES
Pursuant to Orders and recommendations of the Court, the parties to this

action mediated in good-faith and discussed settlement on several occasions to no
avail. Although the amount of the damage award in the matter in controversy
before the Court is small relative to those of other matters which the Court
adjudicates, and although an award of attorney fees in this case would likely dwarf
the compensatory damages award, public policy factors compel the conclusion that
attorney fees be awarded. Denying an attorney fees award to a prevailing party
who has negotiated to receive them (particularly a defendant), and who has proven
non-liability for claims asserted against him, is contrary to sound public policy in
that it denies innocent parties the ability to escape attempts to extort them to pay

10

unjust claims in those situations, such as this, where the damages wrongfully
claimed total less than the attorney fees necessary to defend against them.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's nonaward of attorney fees and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to
enter an award of attorney fees and costs against Robertson in favor of 14. 14 also
requests its attorney fees and costs on appeal.

DATED AND SIGNED this

day of April, 2009.

Attorney for Appellant

n

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

,W»
I hereby certify that on t h i s ^ \ day of April, 2009, <?true and correct cop
the foregoing APPELLANT'S INTIAL BRIEF was served by the following
method(s) on the person(s) indicated below:
V J J S Mail, Postage Prepaid
James Mclntyre
McINTYRE & GOLDEN, L.C.
3838 South West Temple, Suite 3
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
(801)266-3399

Facsimile
Hand-Delivery
Federal Express

•IV

DATED and SIGNED this4_\_ day of April, 2009

JTEVENL.RINEHART
Attorney for Appellant
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As provided in Rule 54(d), costs shall be awarded to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs.[FN1] Thus, the determination of who qualifies as a prevailing party is central to
deciding whether costs are available.
Usually the litigant in whose favor judgment is rendered is the prevailing party for purposes of
Rule 54(d).[FN2] This is true whether a party prevails as a result of a full trial on the merits or by way
of a settlement.[FN3] Further, the prevailing party at a second trial usually is awarded the costs of
both trials.[FN4] One court has held, however, that a judge is without authority to tax costs against a
person who was not a party even though he actively prosecuted the litigation in the names of two
other persons.[FN5] But there is more recent authority to the contrary on the point.[FN6]
A relatively early case under the federal rules also said that costs are not allowable as a matter of
course to the successful party in an equity proceeding,[FNZ] but this is not strictly correct. Rule 54(d)
does not draw any distinction between actions for equitable and those for legal relief. Consequently,
unless the court otherwise directs, the prevailing party is entitled to recover costs regardless of the
nature of the lawsuit.[FN8]
The fact that a party succeeds on the claims presented does not necessarily mean that full costs
will be recovered, however. For example, the general rule is that a judgment for costs for one party
may be set off against a judgment for another in the same action.[FN9] Indeed, there is a passage in
one case that indicates that a judgment for costs in the court of appeals may be set off against a
judgment for costs in the Supreme Court, but it is a cloudy one.[FN10] Further, this result is unsound
since a determination of who is the prevailing party for purposes of awarding costs should not depend
on the position of the parties at each stage of the litigation but should be made when the controversy
is finally decided. Even the general set-off rule is subject to exceptions with regard to costs. Thus, it
has been held that a judgment for defendant for costs in a seaman's civil action for personal injuries
may not be set off against the seaman's recovery in admiralty for cure and maintenance.[FN11]
Similarly, when defendant is successful on appeal, and the appellate court awards costs of the appeal,
defendant is entitled to execute on that costs judgment, and it should not be set off against the
judgment on the merits obtained by plaintiff.[FN12]
Cost awards for prevailing parties are available to both plaintiffs and defendants.[FN13] Thus, a

dismissal of the action, whether on the merits or not, generally means that defendant is the
prevailing party.[FN14] Indeed, it has been held that costs may be awarded to a prevailing defendant
in a civil-rights action even though the suit was brought by an indigent prisoner because of the need
to discourage frivolous claims and treat all litigants alike.[FN15]
A party who is only partially successful also can be deemed a prevailing party. Consequently, a
claimant who has obtained some relief usually will be regarded as the prevailing party even though he
has not sustained all his claims.[FN16] In some cases of this type, however, the court will apportion
costs among the parties[FN17] or reduce the size of the prevailing party's award to reflect the partial
success.[FN18] Similarly, when the jury finds for plaintiff as to liability, it has been held that plaintiff
is the prevailing party and entitled to costs even though the jury determines that plaintiff has suffered
no more than nominal damages.[FN19]
Further, in suits seeking injunctive relief, if the defendant alters its conduct so that plaintiffs claim
becomes moot before judgment is reached, costs may be allowed if the court finds that the changes
were the result, at least in part, of plaintiff's litigation.[FN20] The key in these cases is whether the
plaintiff actually has gained some benefit, either directly or indirectly, from the litigation. If not, the
mootness of plaintiff's claim may prevent a finding that plaintiff is a prevailing party entitled to
attorney's fees. Thus, in Rhodes v. Stewart,[FN21] the Supreme Court held that when an action
challenging prison officials who had refused permission to subscribe to a magazine was not brought
as a class action, and one of the two inmates had died prior to the issuance of the district court's
order and the other had been released from prison prior to the order, neither was a prevailing party
under Section 1988 of Title 42. The fact that the court entered a declaratory judgment finding that
plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated was immaterial because that
judgment could not affect the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff since plaintiffs no longer
were within defendant's control.
The definition of who qualifies as the prevailing party for purposes of costs sometimes becomes
complicated in multiparty disputes.[FN22] In some instances, the same general rules prevail. Thus,
an intervenor is entitled to the same cost considerations as the original parties.[FN23] Similarly, a
successful counterclaimant generally will be considered the prevailing party when plaintiff fails to
recover or is awarded less than defendant receives on the counterclaim.[FN24] Not every party who
appears to have been successful necessarily will qualify as the prevailing party, however, because the
joinder of parties or claims may result in some other litigant being more deserving of costs.[FN25] For
example, a defendant may be liable for the costs of a third-party defendant if the former prevails in
the original action so that the latter is released from liability,[FN26] and the third-party defendant
also may be able to collect costs from the original plaintiff if the plaintiff loses, at least when the
third-party defendant has vigorously defended the actions of the original defendant.[FN27] A party
who effectively interpleads adverse claimants is generally the prevailing party, however, and is
entitled to costs for the first stage of the interpleader.[FIM28]
[FNa45] Charles Alan Wright Chair in Federal Courts, The University of Texas.
[FNa46] Bruce Bromley Professor of Law, Harvard University.
[FINa47] John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, Chancellor and Dean Emeritus,
University of California, Hastings College of the Law.

[FN1] Otherwise directs
A discussion of how the courts have exercised their discretion in awarding costs appears
in § 2668.
[FN2] Judgment winner
Defendant who did not obtain a judgment in its favor in the trial court was not a
"prevailing party" by virtue of its successful post-trial motion in obtaining a reduction of
plaintiff's damages award, and thus the district court erred in taxing defendant's post-

trial, pre-appeal costs against plaintiff. Republic Tobacco Co. v. North Atl. Trading Co.,
C.A.7th, 2007, 481 F.3d 442.
Denial of ERISA benefits claimant's request for an award of costs on the ground that she
was not a "prevailing party/' having sued to prevent a setoff against her benefits based
on any portion of a workers' compensation award but having succeded merely in limiting
the amount of the setoff to the net amount of the workers' compensation award, as
reduced by attorney fees and expenses that she incurred in obtaining that award, was
based on an erroneous standard of what it means to be a "prevailing party" and
constituted an abuse of discretion; by her efforts, the claimant had succeeded in
changing the legal relationship between herself and the plans and had obtained more
than $20,000. Leonard_y. Southwestern Bell Corp.disability Income Plan, C.A.8ih, 2Q05,
408 F.3d 528.
Terminated employee was the only prevailing party, in a Title VII action, for purposes of
entitlement to costs, when he prevailed on a claim that the employer created a hostilework environment under Title V I I , even though the employee lost on the claims that his
termination was discriminatory and that he was discharged in retaliation for the assertion
of protected rights. Barbery. T.D. Williamson, Inc., C. A. 10th, 2001, 254 F.311223,
1234, quoting Wright, Miller & Kane.
In former employee's action against his former employer for violation of the ADA and
wrongful discharge, the former employer was the "prevailing party" entitled to an award
of costs after the district court entered summary judgment in its favor, even though an
appeal by the former employee was pending. Hoeller v.JEaton Corp., C.A.7th, 1998, 149
F.3d 6 2 1 .
Patentee's competitor who received no money damages but obtained a declaration that
patentee's patents were invalid and succeeded on the patentee's counterclaim for patent
infringement damages was a "prevailing party" entitled to an award of costs. Manildra
Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., CA.Fed. 1996, 76 F.3d 1178, citing Wright, Miller &
Kane.
Father was entitled to award of costs as "prevailing party" in an action by nonresident
mother for return of child to Germany pursuant to International Child Abduction
Remedies Act, when father won case in the district court but case was mooted by tragic
happenstance of child's death while mother's appeal was pending. Slagenweit v.
Slagenweit, C.A.8th, 1995, 63 F.3d 719.
Robinson Farms Co. v. D'Acquisto, C.A.7th, 1992, 962 F.2d 68 0, 683, citing Wright,
Miller & Kane.
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,Jnc, C.A.4th, 1978, 580 J ^ d 1222.
Constantino v. American S/T Achilles, C.A.4th, 1978, 580 F.2d 1 2 1 .
In re Nissan Antitrust Litigation, CA.Sth, 1978, J577 F.2d 9 1 0 , certiorari denied 99 S.Ct.
843, 439 IKS. 1072, 59 L.Ed.2d 38.
Nationwide BIdg. Maintenance Inc. v. Sampson, C.A.D.C.1977, 559 F.2d 704, 708, citing
Wright & Miller.
An award of costs to plaintiffs for the first trial, at which the jury verdict was for
defendant, was not an abuse of discretion, since, though plaintiffs' motion for new trial
was granted through no fault of defendant, plaintiffs were the ultimate prevailing parties.
Givens v. Lederle, C.A.5th, 1977, 556 F.2d 1341.
A widow was the prevailing party within the rule authorizing an award of costs, even
though defendant was entitled to a setoff against the judgment for reasons extraneous to
the dispute between the two parties. d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., C.A.9th, 1977,
552 F.2d 886, 896, citing Wright & Miller.
Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, PA., C.A.3d, 1976, 530 F.2d 536.
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, C.A.D.C.1974, 505 F.2d 386
When the real contest in a tort action in admiralty to recover for damage to plaintiffs
dock facilities was between the defendants rather than between plaintiff and defendants
and plaintiff had prevailed on all the issues, plaintiff was entitled to recover costs. Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Tug Pensacola, C.A.5th, 1973, 472 F.2d 1175.
Limousine drivers were the "prevailing party" in their putative collective action under the
FLSA against the operator of a limousine service and its parent, seeking recovery of
unpaid overtime compensation, as required to obtain an award of costs, although they

obtained an award of $300,000 in damages when they had sought approximately
$15,000,000. Powell v. Carey Intern., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
Party who prevailed in an underlying patent-infringement action was entitled to an award
of costs, when the district court granted summary judgment in the prevailing party's
favor on all issues, and the losing party did not overcome the presumption in favor of
awarding costs to the prevailing party. Leggett & Piatt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co.,
D.C.III.2001, 149 F.Supp.2d 394.
Insurance Commissioner as receiver was "prevailing party" since Commissioner obtained
a favorable verdict on two of four counts and was awarded damages in excess of $13
million, and, thus, the Commissioner was entitled to costs other than attorney fees. Clark
v. Milam, D.C.W.Va.1995, 891 F^Supp. 268.
Green Constr. Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., D.C.Kan. 1994, 153 F.R.D. 670, 674,
citing Wright, Miller & Kane.
AIJLWest Pet Supply Co.__v.JHill's Pet Prods. Diy., Colgate-Palmolive Co., JXC.Kan. 1994,
153 F.R.D. 667, 669, citing Wright, Miller & Kane.
Dowdell v. City of Apopka, Florida, D.C.FIa.1981, 521 F.Supp. 297, 304, citing Wright &
Miller.
Costs would be allowed the plaintiff as a party who had prevailed by way of a motion for
summary judgment and who had not unduly extended nor complicated the resolution of
the issues. Peterson v. Crown Financial Corp., D.C.Pa.1980, 498 F.Supp. 1177.
Neloms v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., D.C.La.1977, 440 F.Supp. 1353.
Shires v. Magnavox Co.7 D.CTenn.1976, 432 F.Supp. 2 3 1 .
Tasby v. Estes, D.C.Tex.1976, 416 F.Supp. 644.
Collins v. Retail Credit Co., D.C i Mich.l976, 415 F.Supp,, 92_4 (consumer successful in
action to enforce liability for noncompliance with Fair Credit Reporting Act).
Glassman Constr. Co. v. Maryland City Plaza, Inc., D.C.Md.1974, 3 7 1 F.Supp. 1154.
Compare
Plaintiff who obtained a judgment with no damages was not a "prevailing party"
presumptively entitled to costs under Rule 54(d)(1). Tunison v. Continental Airlines
Corp., C.A.D.C.1998, 162 F.3d 1187, 1189, citing Wright, Miller & Kane.
Attorney's fees
For purposes of a claim for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, an alien was a
"prevailing party" in his action seeking a writ of mandamus directing the United Stats
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
adjudicate his pending application for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident,
despite the claim that the USCIS voluntarily agreed to adjudicate the alien's application
once he submitted a replacement form; the court's ruling was a binding judgment that
altered the legal relationship between the parties in exactly the manner requested by the
alien, and an eleventh-hour promise to adjudicate the application did not negate the
necessity of the court's order or remove the judicial imprimatur thereof. Aboushaban v.
Mueller, D.C.CaL2007^ 475JF.Supp.2d 943.
Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, it is the prevailing party rather than
the lawyer who is entitled to attorney's fees and thus the attorney lacked standing to
claim fees in his own name as real party in interest. Brown v. G^ner^Motor^CorjD,^
C.A.2d, 1983, 722 F.2d 1009.
In plaintiff surety company's suit seeking a declaration that the contractor's bond issued
in its name had been forged, the district court did not abuse its discretion, after declaring
void the contractor's bond, in denying a motion for attorney fees filed by the
representative of the losing defendant class since neither state nor federal law supported
a fee award to a nonprevailing party. Western Sur. Co. v. Lums of Cranston, Inc.,
C.A.lst, 1980, 618 F.2d 854.
A Caucasian female, who brought an employment-discrimination suit against the Hawaii
Department of Labor and Industrial Relations for discriminatory employment practices in
favor of Japanese-American males and who obtained a judgment in her favor and relief in
the form of retroactive promotion, back pay and all the employee benefits she would
have received had she been promoted, was the "prevailing party" for purposes of

determining attorney fees, although damages had not been calculated yet. Feher v.
Department of Labor & Indus. Relations, D.C.Haw.1983, 561 F.Supp. 757.
For a discussion of the difficulties in identifying prevailing parties for attorney fees
purposes, see Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the
Problem, 1986 Duke L J . 4 3 5 , 4 4 9 - 4 5 5 .
But compare
The illegal alien did not prevail in his action against the Immigration and Naturalization
Service when he obtained a temporary restraining order preventing his deportation and
extension of his voluntary departure date; rather, the court merely preserved the status
quo by warding off threatened irreparable harm, and, therefore, the alien's attorneys
were not entitled to recover fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act. RicoSorio v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., D.C.Or.1982, 552 F.Supp. 965.
Bid protestor was not a "prevailing party" within the meaning of the Equal Access to
Justice Act in a bid-protest action against the contracting government agency, precluding
an award of attorney fees and costs to the protestor; there was no final judgment on the
merits or written finding issued in the bid protest, and the trial court's remarks at a
hearing on a temporary restraining order were insufficient to establish that the
contracting agency had acted unlawfully. Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. U.S.,
C.A.Fed.2002, 288 F.3d 1371, certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 8 7 1 , 537 U.S. 1106, 154
L.Ed.2d 775.
[FN3] Settlement
When the products-liability action was tried on the merits, and the jury found, in
response to special interrogatories, that plaintiffs injuries were caused by a defect in the
tire which was present when the tire left the manufacturer's control, plaintiff was the
"prevailing party" entitled to costs, even though the parties worked out a settlement
concerning the issue of damages rather than submitting the issue to the jury. Liedberg v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., D.C.Ga.1984, 102 F.R.D. 249.
Dillard v. City of Foley, D.C.AIa.l998 f 995 F.Supp. 1358.
Attorney's fees
To be considered a prevailing party for purposes of determining attorney fees in a civilrights action, plaintiff need not have succeeded at the trial on the merits, so long as
through settlement or otherwise plaintiff has vindicated his or her rights. Illinois Welfare
Rights Organization y. Miller, C A . 7 t h , 1983,_723 F.2d 564.
Although the securities fraud action was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs with prejudice
pursuant to the parties' stipulation, defendants were "prevailing parties" so as to be
entitled to attorney fees under the applicable rule when the stipulation and order of
dismissal expressly reserved to them the right to move for costs and disbursements.
Nemeroff v. Abelson r C.A.2d, 1980, 620 F.2d 33 9.
Parties applying for attorney fees, each of whom played an instrumental role in the
negotiations that produced the stipulated plans adopted by the court and each of whom
had received a significant amount of the relief they prayed for when they entered a suit
challenging the constitutionality of the 1981 reapportionment of the state legislature and
Arizona's congressional districts, were prevailing parties, within the meaning of the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act. G_odda_rd v..Babbitt,.D.C.Ariz. 1982, 547 F.Supp. 373.
In a § 1983 action, the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs may be considered a prevailing
party under the applicable fee-shifting statute when they resolved their dispute with
defendants through a private settlement over which the district court retained
enforcement jurisdiction; judicial action other than a judgment on the merits or a consent
decree can support an award of fees, so long as that action carries with it sufficient
judicial imprimatur, and the district court's retention of jurisdiction carried sufficient
judicial approval of the settlement to support the award of fees. Roberson v. Giuliani,
C.A.2d, 2003, 346 F.3d Z5_.

[FN4] Prevail at second trial
When, after a district-court judgment for plaintiff in an action on a note was vacated and
remanded by the court of appeals, the district court again entered judgment for plaintiff,
the taxing of costs of the first trial and the first appeal against plaintiff was improper.
Yedlin v. Lewis, C.A.5th, 1963, 320 F.2d 1 5 .
Mederv. Everest & Jennings, Inc., D.C.Mo.1982, 553 F.Supp. 149, 150, citing Wright &
Miller.
Farmery. Arabian Am. Oil Co., D.C.N.Y.1962, 31 F.R.D. 191, reversed on other grounds
C.A.2d, 1963, 324 F.2d 359, reversed 1964, 85 S.Ct. 4 1 1 , 379 U.S. 227, 13 L.Ed.2d 248.
Connolly v. Commercial Nat. Bankjjn Shreveport, D.C.La.1950, 89„FiSupjD._976, amended
on other grounds D.C.La.1950, 90 F.Supp. 264, modified on other grounds C.A.5th,

1951, 189 F.2d 608.
But compare
California Fruit Exchange v. Henry, D.C.Pa.1951, 94 F.Supp. 653.
[FN5J Not a party
Strong v. Broward County Kennel Club, D.C.FIa.1948, 77 F.Supp. 262, appeal dismissed

C.A.5th, 1948, 170 F.2d 72.
Compare
In an unsuccessful class action, eight representatives were jointly and severally liable for
the award of costs, but neither the federal rules nor due process would tolerate an award
against class members who were not given notice and an opportunity to opt out of the
case. White v. Sundstrand Corp., C.A.7th, 2001, 256 F.3d 580.
[FN6] Contrary authority
In an employment-discrimination action by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission against the employer and the union, the trial court, following a settlement
between the EEOC and the employer, did not abuse its discretion, in assessing in equal
portions among the parties the $2,500 fee of the special master appointed to hear the
case, when the union had taken an active part in the litigation by seeking to realign itself
as a plaintiff to the action, by appearing at the preliminary pretrial conference, by filing
an answer to the complaint, by stipulating as to the dismissal of the party defendant, and
by filing the memorandum opposing the employer's motion to dismiss. EEOC v.
International Union of Ejec., Radio & Mach. Workers,J\FL-CIO, CLC, Local 758, C.A,6th,
1980, 631 F.2d_81, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 565, 449 ILS. 10_10, 66 L,Ed.2d 468.
When the mother of the deceased, after collecting workmen's compensation in South
Carolina from the insurance carrier of the deceased's employer, brought an action in a
federal district court in South Carolina against the alleged joint tortfeasors for the death
of the deceased, and the insurance carrier endorsed on the bottom of the complaint a
consent that the action be brought without waiving any rights as subrogee under the
applicable compensation statute, and the amended complaint was filed alleging that the
insurance carrier was subrogated to the extent of $8,000 and the insurance carrier
obtained an order from the district court allowing it to file pleadings setting up a lien for
the $8,000 it had paid, and summary judgment was entered on the merits for the alleged
joint tortfeasors, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal, and certiorari was denied,
judgment would be entered against the insurance carrier for costs taxed against the
mother and in favor of the alleged joint tortfeasors, even though the insurance carrier
was not a named plaintiff and even though it permitted the litigation to be handled by
counsel for the estate of the deceased. Berry v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co.,
D.C.S.C.1960, 185 F.Supp. 699.
[FN7] Equity proceeding

Crutcher v. Joyce, C.C.A.lOth, 1945, 146 F.2d 518.
[FN8] Practice applicable
Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, C.A.3d, 1985, 758 F.2d 897,
926, quoting Wright, Miller & Kane.
Unless otherwise provided by statute or a rule of court, costs in equity do not always
follow the outcome of the suit, but rest in the sound discretion of the court according to
the justice of the cause or the facts and circumstances of the particular case, although
the prevailing party is prima facie entitled to costs, and it is incumbent on the
unsuccessful party to show circumstances sufficient to overcome that presumption. In re
Northern Indiana Oil C o ^ C L A ^ t h , 1951, 192 F.2d 139.
Because of the deliberateness of plaintiff manufacturer's acts of trademark infringement
and unfair competition, defendant manufacturer was entitled to its costs as part of the
judgment in an action charging trademark infringement and antitrust violations. American
Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Creme Labs., Inc., D.C.III.1968, 291 F.Supp. 645, 654, affirmed in
part, reversed in part C.A.7th, 1970, 420 FJ>d 1248, defendant's petition for certiorari
denied 90 S.Ct. 1820, 398_U.S.„929, 26 L.Ed.2d 9 1 , plaintiff's petition for certiorari
denied 91 S.Ct. 37, 400 U.S. 820, 27 L.Ed.2d 47.
Brown v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., CXC.Del. 1955, 18 FJR.D^433.
[FN9] Set-off
Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co. v. Forman, C.A.5th, 1979, 600 F.2d 4 8 1 , 485, quoting
Wright & Miller.
As a set-off against the costs allowed defendant, which prevailed on appeal, the district
court properly allowed plaintiff the expenses it incurred in preparing for a deposition that
was precipitously canceled by defense counsel's last-minute announcement that the
deponent would not appear. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, C.A.2d, 1975, 515 F.2d
173, noted 1975, 8 Conn.L.Rev. 149, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 1147, 424 U.S. 934, 47
L.Ed.2d 341.
[FN 10] Court of appeals costs
Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., C.A.4th, 1948, 170 F.2d 770, 7 7 2 , certiorari
denied 69 S.Ct. 1149, 337 U.S. 920, 93 L.Ed. 1729.
[FN11] Seaman's action
Cornell v. GyltQLLCpjrp.^ D_,CPaJL9_40^_35 F.Supp. 448.
See also
Taylor v. Calmar S. S. Co., D.C.Pa.1938, 35 F.Supp. 335.
[FN12] No offset
Stearns v. Tinker & Rasor, C.A.9th, 1957, 252 F.2d 589, 606.
Broffe v. Horton, C.A.2d, 194_9, 173 F.2d 56„5.
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Jacobson, D.C.Mo.1965, 37 F.R.D. 427 (a careful and scholarly
discussion of the question by Judge John W. Oliver).
[FN13] Defendants prevail
The mere fact that plaintiff, as the unsuccessful party in a patent-infringement action,
was an ordinary party acting in good faith and neither harassing defendants nor abusing
legal process was not in itself sufficient to overcome the presumption that defendants

were entitled to costs as prevailing parties. Popeil Bros., Inc. v. Schick Elec, Inc.,
C.A.7th, 1975, 516 F.2d 772.
Defendant was entitled to costs of $1,851.91 as the "prevailing party" in a civil action in
which plaintiff unsuccessfully asserted a claim in excess of $83,000 and defendant
unsuccessfully asserted a counterclaim for $4,494, since only a very small fraction of the
five-day trial was spent on the proof and defense of the counterclaim, and defendant
successfully defended against plaintiffs much larger claim for damages. Lacovara v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, D.C.Pa.1984, 102 F.FLD. 959.
Judgment for defendant on a motion for summary judgment, unlike dismissal of plaintiffs
complaint with prejudice, is one on which defendant is the prevailing party and entitled to
costs, unless the trial court can articulate justification for denial. IAP, Inc. v. MercedesBenz of N. America, Inc., D.C.N.J. 1983, 571 F.Supp. 262.
A defendant who successfully prosecutes an antitrust counterclaim may tax the statutory
bill of costs as a prevailing party. North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League,
D.C.N.Y.1980, 505 F.Supp. 659.
General Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Bridgeport Broadcasting Station, Inc., D.C.Conn.1931,
53 F.2dJ64 (defendant is prevailing party upon denial of permanent injunction despite
grant of temporary injunction).
In a negligence action brought by a passenger in a vehicle that was rear-ended by
another vehicle against the drivers of both vehicles, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding costs to both drivers after the claims against one driver were
dismissed at the summary-judgment stage, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
other driver; the case was not a close and difficult one, and the fact that the passenger
acted in good faith and with propriety in bringing the action, standing alone, was
insufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of an award of costs to the prevailing
party. McDonald v. Petree, C.A.6th, 2005, 409 F.3d 724.
Award of costs other than attorney's fees to defendant city, in an action under the Clean
Water Act alleging that the city was violating its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System permits, was proper, even if plaintiffs' claim was not frivolous, meritless, or
vexatious because Rule 54(d) creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to the
prevailing party. Russian River Watershed Protection Comm. v. Santa Rosa, C.A.9th,
1998, 142 F.3d 1136.
Prevailing defendant corporations in a securities-fraud action were entitled to an award of
costs, when the district court granted summary judgment on all of plaintiffs' federal
claims and dismissed the state-law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Tirapelli
v. Advanced Equities, Inc., ELC.IN.2002, 222 F.Supp,2d_1081.
[FN14] Dismissal
Fact that plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the state-law claims before trial was sufficient to
confer prevailing party status on defendants for those claims for purposes of an award of
costs. Zenith Ins. Co. v. Breslaw, C.A.9th, 1997, 108 F.3d 205.
In cases not involving settlement, when a party dismisses an action with or without
prejudice, the district court has discretion to award costs to the prevailing party. Cantrell
v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIQ, Local 2021, C.A.lOth, 1995, 69 F.3d
456.
For purposes of awarding costs, defendant city and individual defendants were prevailing
parties in former city employee's civil-rights action when the district court granted
summary judgment to defendants on the employee's federal constitutional claims,
although the federal claims constituted only a small portion of the employee's claims, and
the district court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed the
employee's remaining state law claims. Head v. Medford, C.A. 11th, 1995, 62 F.3d 3 5 1 .
Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., U.S.A., C.A.5th r 1990, 891 F.2d 533, 53 9, citing
Wright, Miller & Kane.
Schwarz v. Folloder, C.A.5th, 1985, 767 F.2d 125, 1 3 1 , citing Wright, Miller & Kane.
Poe v. John Deere Co., C.A.8th, 1982, 695 F.2d 1103 (costs assessed against losing
plaintiff in employment discrimination action).
Sapp v. Renfroe, C.A.5th, 1975, 511 F.2d 172.

"Where, as here, a defendant has been put to the expense of making an appearance and
of obtaining an order for the clarification of the complaint, and the plaintiff then
voluntarily dismisses without amending his pleading, the party sued is the prevailing
party within the spirit and intent of the statute." Corcoran v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
C.C.A.9th, 1941, 121 F.2d 575, 576.
Fernandez v. Southside Hosp., D.C.N.Y.1984, 593 F.Supp. 840, 843, citing Wright &
Miller.
Under the rule allowing the court to award costs to the "prevailing party," when the
action has been dismissed for failure to state a claim, defendant is the "prevailing party."
Lepucki v. Van Wormer, D.C.Ind.1984, 587 F.Supp. 1390, affirmed per curiam C.A.7th,
1985, 765 F.2d 8j6, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 8 6 , J 4 7 4 UJS, 827^ 88i-_,Ed,2d 7 1 .
Even though the dismissal of plaintiffs' claim was without prejudice and was not a
dismissal on the merits, defendants were "prevailing parties" for purpose of taxing costs.
Anderson v. Christian Hosp, Northeast-Northwest, D.C.MoJ.984, 100 F.R.D._497, 498,
citing Wright, Miller & Kane.
The fact that the complaint was brought in good faith is not alone a ground for denying
costs to prevailing parties and a defendant put to the expense and inconvenience equal
to that of the other defendants up to point of plaintiff's consent to the dismissal of
defendant after reading defendant's memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss was
entitled to recover the costs of defending. Reaemco, Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines,
D.C.N.Y.1980, 496 F.Supp. 546.
Defendant was entitled to costs as the prevailing party after plaintiff failed to obtain a
preliminary injunction and subsequently asked for a dismissal with prejudice. Stratton
Group, Ltd. v. Chelsea Nat. Bank, D.C.N.Y.1972^ 54 F.R._D . 227.
When plaintiffs who brought an employment discrimination suit mistakenly joined a union
local as a defendant, upon dismissal of the action against the union local costs would be
taxed against plaintiffs even though plaintiffs had sued the local in reliance upon the illadvised encouragement of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Collins v.
Union Carbide Corp., Chem. Div., D.C.Tex.1971, 52 F.R.D. 208.
Oster v. Rubinstein, D.C.N.Y.1956, 142 F.Supp, 62_0.
Texas Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., D.C.III.1953, 114 F.Supp. 144, affirmed C.A.7th, 1955,
225 F.2d 725.
Prevailing employer was entitled to a costs award to the extent its costs were solely
allocable to claims that the seamen effectively voluntarily dismissed by not submitting
them to the jury and the dismissed claims were subject to the prevailing-party costs rule.
Gwin v. American River Transportation Co., C,A.7th, 2007, 48J2J\3d 96_9.
Civil-rights defendants who obtained a voluntary dismissal of plaintiffs claims with
prejudice were "prevailing parties," who might be entitled to an award of costs under
Rule 54(d). Mathews v. Crosby, C . A . l l t h , 2007, 480 F.3d 1265.
Officials of the county public-school system prevailed in a suspended teacher's procedural
due-process action, as required for the award of costs, even though the teacher's claims
against the teaching assistant had been remanded to the state court, when all of the
teacher's federal claims had been dismissed. Jefferson v. Jefferson County Pub.jSchooJ
Sys., C.A.6th, 2004, 360 F.3d 583.
The district court acted beyond its authority when it precluded the city from requesting
costs after the court dismissed the federal claims against the city with prejudice under
the voluntary-dismissal rule; costs were to be awarded to the prevailing party under the
rule permitting an award of costs to the prevailing party and nothing in the voluntarydismissal rule indicated that after a voluntary dismissal the prevailing party should not
enjoy the normal benefits of a final judgment in its favor. Mother & Father v. Cassidy,
C.A.7th, 2003, 338 F.3d 704.
The State was the prevailing party, in the context of an award of costs by the district
court under Rule 54(d), even though the employee's lawsuit against the State under the
American with Disabilities Act (ADA) was dismissed, due to Eleventh Amendment
immunity, without prejudice to the right of the employee to seek any available relief in
the state court; that disposition was a material alteration in the legal relationship of the
parties because the dismissal eliminated the federal ADA claim from further proceedings
in the federal court. Miles v. California, C.A.9th, 2003, 320 F.3d 986.

Compare
Plaintiff competitor's voluntary dismissal with prejudice of its action against a cabletelevision-service provider and municipality for an alleged violation of the Sherman Act
and § 1983 did not mean that defendant was by definition the prevailing party under Rule
54 and entitled to costs; the dismissal did not mean that there was no value to plaintiff in
having the declaratory judgment and injunctive relief that was entered on its behalf, even
if it subsequently decided not to make use of those rulings and to dismiss the suit.
Knology, Inc. v. Insight Communications Co., C.A.6th, 2006, 460 F.3d 722.
But compare
Plaintiff, who prevailed in an administrative action before the Department of Agriculture
but whose complaint was dismissed by the district court because the statute that plaintiff
had invoked was not applicable to the transaction, was entitled to costs. Guenther v.
Morehead, D.C.Iowa 1967, 272 F.Supp. 721 (applying 7 U.S.C.A. § 210).
Attorney's fees
When the action has been dismissed for failure to state a claim, defendant is the
"prevailing party," for purposes of an attorney fee award. Komasinski v. Internal Revenue
Serv., D.C.Ind.1984, 588 F.Supp. 974.
The Seventh Circuit held that a district court's lack of jurisdiction over the merits of an
environmental organization's action against a steel manufacturer under the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, due to lack of a redressable injury, did not
preclude jurisdiction over the manufacturer's subsequent request for attorneys' fees;
since a dismissal for want of jurisdiction forecloses plaintiff's claim, defendant is the
"prevailing party." Citizens for a Better Environment v. Steel Co., C.A.7th, 2000, 230
F.3d 923, certiorari denied 121 S.Ct. 1653, 532 U.S. 994, 149 L.Ed.2d 636.
But compare
Defendant school district was not "prevailing party" entitled to recover attorney fees
when former superintendent voluntarily dismissed his civil-rights case with prejudice prior
to any judicial determination on the merits; defendant school district was unable to point
to any judicial declaration to its benefit, district had not filed any dispositive motion, trial
court had not addressed merits as to any of superintendent's claims, and there was no
evidence to indicate that superintendent voluntarily dismissed his complaint to avoid
adverse judicial determination on the merits. Hughes v. Unified School Dist. #330,
Wabaunsee County, Kansas, D.C.Kan.1994, 872 F.Supp. 882.
In an action in which defendant sought attorney's fees after plaintiff voluntarily dismissed
its § 1988 action, the Fifth Circuit held that a defendant is not a prevailing party within
the meaning of § 1988 when a civil-rights plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his claim, unless
defendant can demonstrate that plaintiff withdrew to avoid an unfavorable judgment on
the merits and, once this affirmative determination has been made, defendant then must
establish that plaintiff's suit was frivolous, groundless, or without merit. Dean_y. Riser v.
C.A.5th, 2_001,__240 F3d 505.
[FNJL5] Costs against indigent
The district court's decision in a civil-rights action by a prison inmate, not to reduce the
costs awarded to defendants who had obtained a voluntary dismissal with prejudice
based on the inmate's indigency, was not an abuse of discretion, when the magistrate
judge's report and recommendation went through an extensive analysis of each individual
cost and whether the inmate was entitled to a reduction of costs due to his indigence.
Mathews v. Crosby, C . A . l l t h , 2007, 480 F.3d 1265.
Award of costs served valuable purpose of discouraging unmeritorious claims and treated
unsuccessful litigants alike rather than having improper chilling effect on prisoners' civil
rights litigation. McGill v. Faulkner, C.A.7th, 1994, 18 F.3d 456, certiorari denied 115
S.Ct. 233,_513 U.S. 889, 130 L.Ed.2d 157.
Award of $3857.35 in costs against inmate who was unsuccessful in a § 1983 action

